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1. Project Description 
 
My study of the Ford Foundation’s efforts toward establishing peaceful relations 
between East and West and toward the strengthening of democracy in Europe is part of an 
extended research project titled “Cultural Diplomacy and the Reinforcement of Democracy in 
Cold War Europe, 1945-1969.” It attempts to investigate American cultural and educational 
policy in Europe during the Cold War and the broad impact that foreign exchange programs 
have had on the process of furthering the values of democracy and civil society in select 
Western and Eastern European countries. I intend to evaluate the degree of cohesion between 
US foreign policy and the international activity of private foundations, identifying any 
possible connections between them in the enhancement of democracy in Europe. It is of 
highest significance to determine whether these efforts were parallel and complementary, 
separate and independent, or even in conflict or competition.  
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The project focuses primarily on interaction among the actors and institutions 
involved in the democratization process generated by Ford Foundation-sponsored exchange 
programs. These would include the less formal contacts of scientists, universities, research 
centers as well as any encouragement of such liaisons fostered by the US government and 
private foundations. I am trying to determine to what extent the Ford Foundation’s various 
international programs – grants-in-aid, fellowships, overseas research and training, 
intercultural publications and international studies, and exchange of persons – laid the basis 
for friendly relations and mutual understanding between East and West and within the 
Atlantic alliance. I will compare the results of these private efforts with the outcomes of 
government-sponsored exchanges of scholars and official study visits to the US. 
Making use of the Ford Foundation archives, I have investigated the extent to which 
the foundation was able to safeguard individual civil liberties by sponsoring institutions that 
were looking into ways of “strengthening the position of the free world” and “combating 
communist threats.” I have attempted to uncover whether Ford Foundation activities, directly 
or indirectly, strengthened democratic institutions, brought countries into closer relations, or 
made progress towards a reduction of the political, intellectual, scientific and social gap 
between the US and the countries of Western Europe. I have also examined how initiatives 
such as the Eastern Europe Fund, exchange programs with Eastern European countries, and 
other projects for international cultural cooperation served as tools for imparting knowledge 
that helped initiate the struggle for a more democratic world.  
I have thus tried to explore in what ways and to what degree Eastern Europeans’ first-
hand experiences with American institutions became a testing ground for democratic 
institution building, for the establishment of private enterprise, for civic participation, and, 
later on, for local community involvement. In a more detailed way, I have studied the 
Foundation’s policy of funding scholarships, fellowships, and internships for prospective 
leaders, talented individuals, and promising scholars through intermediary institutions such as 
the Institute of International Education (IIE) and the Social Science Research Council. I have 
explored the way the Ford Foundation sponsored groups and individuals willing to build 
coalitions in support of democratic values, and funded the publications and conference 
attendance of young academics, journalists, writers or artists. The primary focus of the study 
has been to evaluate whether Ford Foundation activities enhanced the development of social 
capital, and assisted in forming a network of cooperating countries for the support, 
establishment, or restoration of democracy.  
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I look at the period between 1950, when the foundational Gaither report recommended 
the “internationalization” of Ford Foundation activities, and 1969, the year of the Tax 
Reform, the end of the Johnson administration, and shifts in foreign policy aims that 
coincided with uprisings and pro-democratic demonstrations in Eastern Europe. I look at the 
Foundation’s activities in the three Western European countries of Austria, Germany, and 
Italy, where former dictatorships required the emergence and consolidation of democracy. I 
also study Ford activities in three countries in Eastern Europe: Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and 
Poland. Beginning in the 1950s, each of these countries became a focus of hope for the 
emergence of democratic values and new practices of civil society.  
At the Ford Foundation archives, I looked into the following Office Files: Office of 
the Presidents McGeorge Bundy, H. Rowan Gaither, Henry T. Heald; Office Files of 
Merrimon Cuninggim, John Howard, Robert M. Hutchins, Nancy McCarthy, William 
McPeak, Waldemar Nielsen, Francis X. Sutton, and Cleon O. Swayzee. I looked at various 
divisional Office Files, including Overseas Development, International Training and 
Research, International Division, Education and Culture Program, and the Paris Field Office. I 
also examined almost 300 Unpublished Reports and 120 Grant Files. 
 
2. Some observations on Ford Foundation efforts to strengthen democracy in Europe. 
 
The documents I examined frequently refer to the role that the Ford Foundation hoped 
to play in improving or building democracy in Western Europe, and, since about 1954, 
Eastern Europe as well. The Ford Foundation seems to have discussed its engagement in the 
process of democratization more openly and straightforwardly than the Rockefeller 
Foundation did in its comparable records from the same period. Shepard Stone’s reports, 
written between 1954 and1955, consider new challenges facing the foundation in Europe’s 
changing reality. He highlights a great need for strengthening cooperation between the US 
and Europe, for building solid democracy, for reconstructing education, and for supporting 
American cultural activities there.
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 He supports the view that the Ford Foundation should 
develop programs in Europe, as well as both short and long-term studies of European and 
Atlantic problems and relations. He also speaks of widening European horizons, through 
cooperation with young intellectuals and leaders. He suggests that cultural activities would be 
of great political value in building such relationships.
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Just six months later, Stone sums up several of the trips made by Ford Foundation 
officers to Europe to fulfill important steps taken by the Foundation to strengthen ties with 
Europe.
3
 Stone states bluntly that if Europe wants to meet the challenge of the “impressive 
economic, scientific and social development of Russia,” it “must develop an open, democratic 
society.” He also discusses the role Ford was to play in Europe in comparison with the other 
big private foundations. While Rockefeller and Carnegie were well known and respected in 
Europe, Ford was mainly associated with its programs in India and East Asia. This had to be 
changed through more visits to Europe by respected Ford Foundation representatives. He 
suggests creating one or even several field offices in Europe. In his view, activities needed to 
be centralized if “friendly, permanent relations [were] to be developed with the leaders and 
thinkers of Europe; embarrassment [was] to be avoided; and the Foundation [was] to be 
alerted to important European trends and ideas.” The initial budget of the field office was to 
be one million dollars over a three-year period. Staff were to be increased, and the director 
would spend at least five months in Europe in the course of two or three visits there.
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 In all of 
his reports, Stone emphasizes that the U.S. had very low prestige in Europe, which was 
similar to what it had experienced immediately after the war, but was now attributable mainly 
to the internal conflict of the McCarthy era.  
What is crucial here is Stone’s frequent comparison of Ford’s reputation in Europe in 
relation to the standing of the Rockefeller Foundation and Carnegie Corporation.  He urged 
the preparation of a public relations program to educate the European public about the 
foundation. A preliminary conclusion might thus be made that the Ford Foundation wanted 
not only to expand its activities but also to expand public knowledge about the foundation and 
to improve its public image in general. Stone lists specific projects and programs for 
particular countries, such as exchanges of leaders, cooperation between educational 
institutions, adult education, and conferences for Britain, France, Germany, Yugoslavia, and 
Italy. General projects included European youth movements, the Congress for Cultural 
Freedom, the European Cultural Center, and the Salzburg Seminar.
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In 1960, the Foundation considered extending  the activities it had already been 
undertaking in Eastern Europe under the auspices of the Institute of International Education. 
Of course, there was the question of the possible consequences such programs could produce. 
It appeared likely that these initiatives would prompt the Soviet regime to tighten its grasp on 
the satellite countries and that this negative result may well outweigh the positive 
achievement of establishing a platform for scientific and cultural cooperation.  
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Ford Foundation officers were also pondering the question of which group, students or 
independent scholars, seemed to produce more results in the long run when brought to the US 
under exchange program. On the one hand, the students appeared to be less influential, having 
less impact on their surroundings, their peer groups, and on more broadly defined receiving 
groups than did the scholars. On the other hand, exchange students as a group were a lot 
cheaper and more institutions in the US were involved in organizing and monitoring their 
visits. The State Department suggested that an immediate program directed to countries such 
as Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary should be launched as soon as possible. 
Several rules set for the exchange program included reciprocity of opportunity, access to 
archival material equal to any American student, reasonable freedom to travel and visit public 
places, accommodation for wives at the students’ expense, selection and placement 
procedures similar to that of the Polish students under the IIE, even distribution of candidates 
among different fields, an emphasis on pre-PhD candidates, and, finally, a division of 
financial responsibility similar to that of the Polish program.
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Various projects, such as supporting the study of international affairs and international 
cultural activities, fulfilled the objectives of Areas II and IV of the Ford Foundation program.
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The international program for Europe was considered valid because it corresponded with “the 
objectives of US foreign policy.” The program for “strengthening democratic institutions in 
Europe and developing East-West relations on a democratic basis, ” was thought to be 
improving traditional American ties with Western Europe. The exchange of persons was 
considered to be the most useful because it increased Europeans’ awareness of what was 
happening in the US. Programs conducted by the ITR and IA likewise provided incomparable 
opportunities to expand American knowledge of events behind the Iron Curtain.
8
 Similarly, 
Foundation officers understood that international and area studies contributed to vibrant 
relations between American universities and universities in the Iron Curtain countries (e.g., 
Cracow and Lublin and Notre Dame, Indiana).
9
 Thus, it might be surmised that the Ford 
Foundation’s contribution to promoting  democracy was not only meaningful and long-
lasting, but came at a very “sensitive” time of thaw in Eastern European countries.  
 
3. Case Study: From scholarly exchanges to refugee assistance in Eastern Europe during 
the Cold War. 
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Cold War conditions did not deter the foundations from attempting to expand 
educational exchanges between the two opposing blocs. They sought to improve the quality of 
scientific research, to launch new fields of scientific pursuit, and to develop the overall state 
of knowledge. Taken together, these efforts helped to induce a process of democratization, 
enhancing the building of civic society and the quest for freedom.  
Political unrest, brought about by the first signs of “spring” reaching the countries 
behind the Iron Curtain, gave the foundations challenging new decisions to make and daring 
steps to take. Ford Foundation grantees and fellows were, in many cases, among the 
“enlightened minority” that initiated or at least actively participated in attempts to introduce 
change in Eastern European countries (as were Rockefeller Foundation grant recipients). Such 
attempts included writings, strikes, uprisings, and other forms of resistance that derived from 
general dissatisfaction with economic, social and political conditions.  
Professor Andrzej Korboński of UCLA, who worked with the Ford Foundation on the 
selection process for Polish grantees, stated that “it is difficult if not impossible to draw a 
direct connection between the exchangees and the March 1968 explosion that took place in 
Polish universities and resulted in a major purge of faculty and students. Still, it is interesting 
to note that among the purged professors, most if not all have participated in the Exchange 
Program sponsored by the Foundation.”10 The foundations therefore felt an obligation to 
assist them in all possible ways. Most Ford Foundation activities directed towards relieving 
the refugee problem in Europe concentrated on aid to refugee intellectuals and relocating 
displaced scholars, students, and professors.  
It is worth pointing out that the Foundation treated scholars and intellectuals 
differently depending on their country of their origin. I have attempted to compare how and to 
what extent the Foundation provided help to refugees coming from Poland, Hungary, and 
Czechoslovakia during three particularly turbulent periods of the Cold War. I concentrated on 
the events of 1956 in Hungary and Poland, on 1968 in Czechoslovakia and Poland, and on 
Martial Law in Poland in 1981. Although the underlying causes of events in those countries 
seem to be similar, the international community, the US government and the foundations all 
reacted differently. During the 1956 events Ford (as well as Rockefeller) gave much more 
attention and long-lasting support to Hungarian refugee students than to their Polish 
counterparts. 
The first cause of that discrepancy was the difference in the severity of consequences 
resulting from the uprisings. The reactions of the Communist regimes and the Soviet 
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intervention that followed were considerably milder in Poland. Fewer Poles therefore left the 
country at the time.  
Second, the foundations assumed partial responsibility for helping selected groups in 
an effort to “repair” the passive reaction of the American government that had so willingly 
encouraged “the captive people” of Eastern Europe to reach for freedom but had done nothing 
to assist them when they did.  
Third, applying a lesson that the Rockefeller Foundation had learned the hard way 
when trying to aid refugees during the Second World War, the Ford Foundation sought to 
utilize already existing organizations and institutions. In the foundations’ view, it was much 
better to help receiving countries such as Austria, France, Great Britain, or Germany support 
Hungarian students than to deal with them in the US. The aim of providing grants to 
European universities that would admit students, and of assisting them financially until they 
graduated, was to keep Hungarian refugees in Europe.  
Finally, there was the sheer number of the Hungarian refugee population, which in a 
very short time reached (by some estimates) almost 200,000 (including about 6,500 students 
and 300 intellectuals), turned out to be a greater burden to the neighboring countries than 
anyone had expected or was prepared for.
11
  
In the spring of 1968 intellectuals and scholars in Czechoslovakia and Poland stood 
against the Communist regimes that limited their right to free expression. Censored, 
ostracized, fired, threatened, and terrorized for their political views or their ethnic background 
(of the 20,000 Poles that left Poland many were of Jewish origin), many intellectuals were 
forced to leave their countries. The American foundations were the first to offer them 
assistance by organizing relocation or resettlement in Western European and American 
universities.  
Assistance to the exiles of the 1968 Eastern European Spring was mostly directed to 
those who refused to cooperate with the Communist regimes. The lack of freedom for 
intellectual exploration and the pursuit of knowledge in their home countries led them to 
decide to continue their work in exile. Another group of Polish grantees was composed of 
those who had been forcibly deported, with no right to return. Their passports had been 
confiscated and they had been handed a document stating that they were not Polish citizens 
and were not allowed to re-enter the country. This last group escaped the persecutions, death 
threats, and direct attacks on their families and friends, who were frequently arrested by the 
Militia or the SB (Security Service of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs) to be 
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interrogated, beaten, and blackmailed into cooperating and denouncing others. Many lost their 
lives to murder and suicide.  
In the case of Czech refugees that year, the Foundation’s policy was provisional, 
subject to revision as changing circumstances required. Czechs were to be encouraged to stay 
in Europe, as care was to be taken not to “contaminate” Czech intellectuals with Western 
ideas that would make it difficult for them to return to Czechoslovakia. Universities both in 
Europe and in the US were to bear most of the financial burden. A major, well-publicized 
fellowship program was to be avoided, as it would serve as a magnet to attract Czechs out of 
the country. The Foundation made financial resources available to the American Council of 
Learned Societies (ACLS) for refugee work and to the International Association for Cultural 
Freedom for help in placing them in universities.
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 The persecution of Polish intellectuals intensified when Martial Law was introduced 
in December 1981, as “General Jaruzelski’s junta incorporated in its program measures 
aiming at the annihilation of Polish culture.” The group of intellectuals excluded from 
universities, those who refused to sign the “declaration of loyalty,” grew bigger. With the help 
of Helsinki Watch, the Ford Foundation developed a typology of human rights activity to be 
applied in Eastern Europe to address concrete problems of Foundation support. The proposed 
practice worked well for the support of of human rights and for the establishment of 
intellectual freedom in Eastern Europe. The Foundation’s main categories of human rights 
included:  
 Individual self-expression, without censorship or any kind of ideological control, the 
freedom to continue with one’s work in spite of persecution, harassment, or lack of 
formal employment.  
 Societal self-organization (a term used by the Polish opposition): intellectual 
endeavors done independently of the official repressive system in the form of theaters, 
seminars, publication of books, pamphlets, journals, or producing other forms of art. 
The Polish Flying University, the Czechoslovak “Petlice” (Padlock) book series,and 
the Yugoslav journal “praxis,” are perhaps the best examples. 
 Social self-defense: local organizations established in order to defend human rights, to 
document and report any human rights violations and to organize support for the 
victims of abuses. Organizations that helped to inform the national and international 
communities about human rights violations included the Social Self-Defense 
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Committee (KOR) and many others in Poland, and  Charter 77 and the Committee for 
the Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted in Czechoslovakia.
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These categories functioned in almost all countries in Eastern Europe: Hungary, 
Romania, East Germany, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. Poland, however, seems to have 
been the most active. In the 1980s, increased repression by the communist regimes forced all 
activists, intellectuals, and workers to conduct their activities with greater care and secrecy, 
and on a smaller scale, due to growing personal risks from persecution and imprisonment to 
assassination.  
There were forms of resistance that were not specifically addressed by the Foundation: 
dissent by religious groups and churches; open political opposition taken by the political 
parties or underground movement. Both forms were active and present in Poland. In other 
countries additional activities largely took the form of terrorist attacks or revolutionary 
strategies. 
The Ford Foundation targeted several types of East European human rights activities 
for support. The first type took the form of various largely informal and voluntary outside 
organizations, the majority of them underfunded, that furnished direct assistance to refugees. 
They helped refugees communicate with relatives at home, organized aid to prisoners, and 
collected funds for individual scholars and artists, or for undertakings such as the Flying 
University and the publications of the intelligentsia. They also translated Western literature to 
make it available to the local audience and translated local literary work for international 
circulation .  
The second type involved Western human rights organizations with direct or indirect 
connections to those existing in Eastern Europe, mainly through exiles who were already 
well-established abroad. They helped to document and distribute information about human 
rights violations, and about movements and individuals. The Chekhov Publishing 
Corporation, generously funded by the Ford Foundation, is one example of this type of 
grantee.  
A third category comprised formal organizations in democratic countries, such as 
Amnesty International or Helsinki Watch, that sought to raise global awareness and to exert 
pressure on local governments to stop repressive activities,, as well as to pressure their own 
governments to criticize regimes, to act and demand greater freedom.
14
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Other types of activity that the Foundation sponsored include the publication of 
journals (“Survey,” “Index on Censorship,” “Freedom Appeals”), the work of institutes 
researching human rights issues, and law firms organizing the defense of victims. 
Deriving some experience from the Rockefeller Foundation’s successful support for 
Hungarian refugee students, the Ford Foundation was able to avoid many mistakes in the 
wake of the events of 1968 and to launch a well-planned program for Polish refugees in 1981. 
The difference in its approach might have also resulted from a study the Foundation 
undertook between 1975 and 1978. Bearing the title “Human Rights and Intellectual 
freedom,” this project shifted the Foundation’s interests towards “the strengthening of 
intellectual freedom and the free flow of ideas and information into and out of repressive 
societies.”15 General rules were rarely applied to all groups of refugees, though in the 1980s 
some common procedures and directives were given to intermediaries such as voluntary 
agencies, foreign governmental organizations, and universities . Ford Foundation action on 
Eastern Europe included: 
 
 Continued emergency funding for refugees: Polish refugees in the US were funded 
through the International Research & Exchanges Board (IREX) and ACLS in the US, 
as well as the Fondation pour une Entraide Intellectuelle Européenne (FEIE) for 
refugees in Europe; 
 Support for policy, coordination, and organizational matters within the general context 
of refugee work; 
 Support for the intellectual needs of exiles, such as providing individual scholarships 
(L. Kołakowski, Z. Bauman), AND granting funds for conference organizing and for 
literary publishing efforts (K. Jeleński, Cz. Miłosz); 
 Support for activities in Poland, including free intellectual and cultural endeavors (the 
so-called “parlor culture”), such as independent publications that would reach local 
audiences (these were among the most generously sponsored); 
 Scholarly research and documentation (on “Solidarity,” Oral History Project); 
 Area studies, such as Polish studies and studies of agricultural development in Eastern 
Europe (F. Levcik) or on the economy (I. Sachs).
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My archival research allowed me to draw up a set of informal guidelines that were 
repeatedly used by the Ford Foundation in its handling of Polish, Czechoslovakian, Russian 
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and Hungarian refugees. The unwritten rules of the program for aiding Eastern European 
refugees covered areas such as: 
 
 Procedures for selecting the “valuable” intellectuals to be assisted; 
 A methodology of ascribing “A” and “B” status to refugees; 
 A detailed screening process; 
 Channeling funds rather than direct Foundation involvement; 
 Taking into account any possible impact made on local political climates and future 
cooperation with local regimes; 
 Cooperation with voluntary agencies, universities, human rights and refugee 
organizations;  
 Avoiding possible problems in the selection procedures of intermediary organizations; 
 Regulating support for locally active human rights activists, student organizations, 
dissidents;  
 Aiding interned or imprisoned opposition leaders;  
 Encouraging intellectuals living and working abroad to help refugees at home;  
 Setting fixed periods for assistance;  
 Cooperating with the US State Department rather than criticizing government 
ineptitude and lack of action; 
 Working with US embassies and refugees in bordering countries; 
 Funding specific intellectual projects in order to avoid mere subsistence support;  
 
In the period 1981-1983, Polish intellectuals constituted a very particular category of 
refugees. For the most part they were not dissidents or defectors (which was the case with 
East German and Czechoslovakian refugees), nor were they émigrés. Rather, they were 
largely from the political mainstream, and went abroad with the permission of the Polish 
government. They sometimes even traveled with the government’s own sponsorship, under an 
exchange program, doing professional work, or accepting visiting professorships. While they 
were abroad in 1981, the events of December 13 took them by surprise. Some, against advice 
from the FEIE, for example, decided to return home immediately, risking internment or some 
other form of persecution (it did not matter that they had gone abroad with the regime’s 
blessing; the fact that they had spent time in the West made them a direct danger in the junta’s 
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eyes). Others hesitated, and over time it became harder and riskier for them to return. Still 
others were determined to resettle and, at least for the time being, to continue their 
professional and scholarly interests while waiting for the situation at home to improve. 
The Ford Foundation made funds available to recipients through IREX. These 
payments were classified not as political resettlement grants or as career-transition support, 
but rather as “an ad hoc expansion of routine international exchange and cooperative 
activities,” meaning that Poles abroad were to be treated as regular visitors. This approach 
allowed for the avoidance of direct conflict with the Polish regime, in the interest of resuming 
academic cooperation once Martial Law was repealed.  
In spite of a large caseload, the Ford Foundation tried to meet individual needs with 
the assistance of intermediary organizations such as the FEIE and IREX. Exiled intellectuals 
and scholars were to be provided material support to enable those who were unemployed to 
continue with their creative activity and to supplement the meager earnings of those with jobs. 
It was equally crucial to ensure that they had free time at their disposal, in order to avoid any 
charges of their being parasites who were fully dependent on external aid. Refugee 
intellectuals were to be given easy access to international books and journals and any other 
materials they needed for their work. Personal intellectual contacts with the outside world 
were also critical, even by correspondence or via telephone conversation.
17
 Finally, exiled 
artists, scholars and intellectuals desired moral encouragement to pursue their endeavors. 
International recognition for their struggle and achievements, either through publications or 
awards, such as the Nobel Prize in Literature given to Czesław Miłosz in 1980 or the Nobel 
Peace Prize for “Solidarity” leader Lech Walesa in 1983, provided inspiration and 
reassurance.  
The overall impact of Ford Foundation activities on civic participation and democratic 
institution building in Eastern Europe remains to be evaluated. It is clear, however, that the 
Foundation’s role in intellectual and academic exchanges, in aid to refugees, in the expansion 
of area and international studies, as well as in improving relations between Western Europe 
and the US during the Cold War all rank among the Foundation’s top achievements and 
contributions to peace building.  
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